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Abstract 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the 
last two decades. This paper analyses the role of trade costs in explaining the increase in 
both the number and the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In particular, 
we distinguish horizontal and non-horizontal M&As and investigate whether distance 
and trade policy barriers affect these two types of mergers differently. We analyse this 
question using industry data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1990-2001. Our 
findings suggest that while in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger 
activity negatively its impact differs importantly across horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers. The impact of trade costs is less negative for horizontal mergers, which is 
consistent with the tariff-jumping argument.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last two 
decades. Given this rapid increase, fully understanding the determinants and implications of 
mergers and acquisitions has been high on the agenda for both policy makers as well as 
academics.  
 
Traditionally, much of the FDI activity, be it M&As or greenfield investment, has been explained by 
the “tariff jumping” argument. This explanation for FDI posits that exporting and investing abroad are 
substitutes, and as trade costs increase (making exporting more costly), firms are more likely to 
choose investing abroad. More recently, studies focussing more on the industrial organisation 
aspect of firm behaviour, have provided alternative views. In these models, it is found that high trade 
costs do not necessarily induce foreign M&As, contrary to the tariff jumping argument.  
 
These theoretical models implicitly relate to horizontal mergers, i.e., mergers between firms in the 
same industry. However, empirically much of international M&A activity involves mergers between 
firms in different industries, that is, vertical and/or conglomerate mergers. For such M&As 
predictions about horizontal mergers may not be straightforwardly applicable. This observation is 
one of the starting points for our paper.  
 
We use micro level data on merger deals, which we aggregate to the industry level to study explicitly 
the impact of trade costs and impediments to trade and investment on M&As, paying particular 
attention to differences between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. Horizontal M&As are 
defined as mergers between firms within the same industry, whereas non-horizontal M&As are 
defined as mergers between firms in different industries. Our data provide detailed information on 
the number and value of international merger deals for a number of OECD countries over the period 
1990 to 2001. 
 
The role of trade costs in determining international exchanges of capital and goods is far from 
negligible despite an increasingly globalised world. Hence, an analysis of the impact of trade costs 
on international merger activity is interesting not only from an academic point of view, but may also 
provide valuable information for policy makers.  
 
In order to take account of the effects of trade impediments on cross-border M&As we consider two 
different types of measures of barriers to trade.  The first one is the distance between the two 
countries; a variable commonly employed in gravity models of trade and investment.  Apart from 
distance we also analyse the impact of trade policy on cross-border M&A via its impact on trade 
costs.  We use detailed data on applied protection based on bilateral ad valorem equivalent data at 
the industry level.   
 
The results suggest that distinguishing empirically between horizontal and non-horizontal M&As 
brings to the fore a number of differences in the determinants between the two types of mergers. 
While in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger activity negatively its impact is 
significantly less pronounced for horizontal mergers than for non-horizontal mergers. Hence, treating 
heterogeneous mergers as a homogenous group at the country level may potentially bias results 
and lead to unreliable conclusions to be drawn from such estimations. The less negative effect on 
horizontal mergers provides support to the tariff jumping argument put forward in the literature on 
the determinants of horizontal FDI. 
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Our findings have important policy implications. The main findings in the paper that cross-border 
M&A respond negatively to trade costs in the aggregate and that the share of horizontal M&A 
increases in the level of trade costs provide an additional rational for free trade. To the extent that 
horizontal mergers are less likely to be associated with productivity spillovers and more likely with 
anticompetitive behaviour up freeing up trade not only increases the level of inward investment but 
also its composition in a way that is likely to benefit the economy.  The trade regime might thus have 
important implications for attracting inward investment in terms of M&As, an issue that should be 
recognised by governments wishing to attract foreign investment in order to benefit from technology 
and spillovers. 
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1. Introduction  
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have increased dramatically over the last 
two decades. In 1999, the value of completed cross-border M&As was around $720 
billion. The value of all M&As, both cross-border and domestic, amounted to an 
equivalent of 8 percent of world GDP in the same year. For comparison, in 1980 this ratio 
was merely 0.3 percent (UN 2001). Also, over that period, most of the growth in foreign 
direct investment flows (FDI) has been attributed to M&As rather than greenfield 
investment (UN 2001). Given this rapid increase, fully understanding the determinants and 
implications of mergers and acquisitions has been high on the agenda for both policy 
makers as well as academics.  
 
Traditionally, much of the FDI activity, be it M&As or greenfield investment, has been 
explained by the “tariff jumping” argument. In a nutshell, this explanation for FDI posits 
that exporting and investing abroad are substitutes, and as trade costs increase (making 
exporting more costly), firms are more likely to choose investing abroad.
1  
 
More recently, studies focussing more on the industrial organisation aspect of firm 
behaviour, have provided alternative views. Horn and Persson (2001) and Norbäck and 
Persson (2004) provide theoretical models where foreign firms may acquire domestic 
acquisition targets, with the acquisition price being determined endogenously in a 
bargaining process. In these models, they find that high trade costs do not necessarily 
induce foreign M&As, contrary to the tariff jumping argument.  
 
Tekin Koru (2004) takes this issue further by providing an explicit model where a foreign 
firm chooses between M&A, greenfield investment or exporting as a means of foreign 
market entry. The acquisition price is again determined endogenously, similar to the 
models above. She shows theoretically that increases in trade costs may make M&As 
more costly vis-à-vis greenfield investment or exporting. She also shows empirically, 
using firm level data for Swedish firms that trade costs are negatively related to the choice 
of M&As as opposed to greenfield or exporting.   
 
                                                 
1 For example, Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital model implies this prediction that high trade costs 
encourage horizontal FDI. See Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), and Blonigen et al. (2003) for evidence in 
line with this argument. 
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It is worthy of note that these IO models implicitly relate to horizontal mergers, i.e., 
mergers between firms in the same industry. However, empirically, as we show in Section 
2, much of international M&A activity involves mergers between firms in different 
industries, that is, vertical and/or conglomerate mergers. Arguably, for such M&As 
predictions about horizontal mergers may not be straightforwardly applicable.
2 This 
observation is one of the starting points for our paper.  
 
We use micro level data on merger deals, which we aggregate to the industry level to 
study explicitly the impact of trade costs and impediments to trade and investment on 
M&As, paying particular attention to differences between horizontal and non-horizontal 
mergers. Horizontal M&As are defined as mergers between firms within the same 
industry, whereas non-horizontal M&As are defined as mergers between firms in different 
industries. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to explicitly 
distinguish these two types of cross-border mergers. Our data, which provide detailed 
information on the number and value of international merger deals for a number of OECD 
countries over the period 1990 to 2001, come from the Thomson Financial Securities 
Global Mergers and Acquisitions database.
3
 
That the role of trade costs in determining international exchanges of capital and goods are 
far from negligible despite an increasingly globalised world economy is made clear by 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). They estimate that the tax equivalent of international 
trade costs for a typical industrial country is 74% (including domestic trade costs this rises 
to 170%). These consist of transportation costs (21%),  tariff and non-tariff policy barriers 
(8%) and other border-related non-policy barriers (33%). Hence, an analysis of the impact 
of trade costs on international merger activity is interesting not only from an academic 
point of view, but may also provide valuable information for policy makers.  
 
In order to take account of the effects of trade impediments on cross-border M&As we 
consider two different types of measures of barriers to trade.  The first one is the distance 
                                                 
2 As an illustration, the Markusen (2002) model arrives at different predictions for horizontal vs. vertical FDI 
in relation to trade costs and other variables.  
3 These data have been used in a limited number of recent studies that investigate specifically the 
determinants of international cross-border M&As (e.g., Di Giovanni, 2005, Bertrand et al., 2004). Di 
Giovanni (2005) uses M&A data at the country level.  Bertrand et al. (2004) use industry level data but do 
not distinguish vertical and horizontal mergers. Also related to our work are empirical papers on the 
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between the two countries; a variable commonly employed in gravity models of trade and 
investment.  Apart from distance we also analyse the impact of trade policy on cross-
border M&A via its impact on trade costs.  We use detailed data on applied protection 
based on bilateral ad valorem equivalent data at the industry level.  These data are 
available from a new unique data set called Market Access Map (MacMap), developed 
jointly by the ITC (UNCTAD-WTO, Geneva) and CEPII (Paris).   
 
Using explicit information on the level of applied protection on trade rather than just 
distance is interesting because the former explicitly relates to the cost of exporting unlike 
distance which may capture informational barriers in addition to pure trade costs (Portes 
and Rey, 2001). Thus, even when distance affects various types of cross-border mergers 
differently we can a priori not be sure whether this is due to the theoretical argument based 
on the interdependence between trade and FDI. Including explicit information on the trade 
policy stance should help to address this problem.   
 
Moreover, using trade policy indicators of imports from the target country by the 
acquisition country in addition to those for imports from the acquisition country by the 
target country allows one to assess to what extent non-horizontal mergers reflect mergers 
of the vertical type, i.e. mergers that are motivated by the desire to exploit international 
differences in factor prices by moving the production of certain parts or components to 
affiliates abroad. Vertical mergers thus tend to be associated with imports by foreign 
affiliates in the target country that are subsequently re-exported to the home country. We 
therefore expect that vertical mergers are negatively affected by trade policy barriers in 
both the acquisition and the target country.  
 
Finally, it may be useful for policy makers to realise that changes in the trade policy 
stance may not only affect the pattern of trade but also the level and composition of 
inward investment. Given the importance policy-makers have attached to attracting 
foreign multinationals this may be an important side-effect of trade policy worth taking 
into account. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
determinants of cross-border equity flows (portfolio investment), see, e.g., Portes and Rey (2005), Portes et 
al. (2001). 
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The results suggest that distinguishing empirically between horizontal and non-horizontal 
M&As brings to the fore a number of differences in the determinants between the two 
types of mergers. While in the aggregate trade costs affect cross-border merger activity 
negatively its impact is significantly less pronounced for horizontal mergers than for non-
horizontal mergers. Hence, treating heterogeneous mergers as a homogenous group at the 
country level may potentially bias results and lead to unreliable conclusions to be drawn 
from such estimations.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the database on 
M&As and describes the pattern of merger activity in the data. In section 3 we develop a 
simple theoretical model of cross-border M&A. Section 4 introduces the empirical model, 
describes the variables and discusses the econometric methodology used to investigate the 
role of trade costs in explaining cross-border mergers. Section 5 presents and analyses the 
estimation results of the basic model. Section 6 extends the basic model to assess to what 
extent and how trade policy affects cross-border M&A through its impact on trade costs. 
Section 7 provides some conclusions.  
 
2. Definitions and Patterns  
Given the close link between the present paper, which focuses on cross-border M&A, and 
the FDI literature, which resolves to an important extent around the role of trade, it is 
worthwhile making clear to what extent cross-border M&A and FDI actually are one and 
the same phenomenon.  
 
Firstly, cross-border M&A is typically considered to be a subset of FDI ranging from 
about 50% to 90% depending on the source that is consulted. The remainder of FDI is 
generally considered to be realised through greenfield investment. Thus, a majority of FDI 
tends to occur through cross-border M&A. Secondly, while thinking of cross-border M&A 
as simply a component of FDI may be useful, strictly speaking the relationship between 
cross-border M&A and FDI is much more complicated as is made clear in UNCTAD’s 
World Invest Report for 2000, which is specifically dedicated to the issue of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. FDI, in contrast to cross-border M&A, solely refers to 
transactions between parents and affiliates. Cross-border M&A includes also investments 
that are financed via domestic and international capital markets. It is not always possible 
to trace the country from which these funds originate. Moreover, FDI refers to net 
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investments whereas M&A refer to gross transactions (acquisitions and divestments). Due 
to those differences, it is therefore well possible that cross-border M&A exceeds the 
documented value of FDI.
4
 
Data on mergers and acquisitions originate from the Global Mergers and Acquisitions 
database included in Thomson Financial Securities. It is claimed that this dataset includes 
all domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions worldwide in excess of one million 
dollar. This dataset has been used relatively little in previous research, although a number 
of studies have used these data to analyse the nature of primarily domestic mergers (for 
example, Gugler et al. 2003). Manchin (2004) and Di Giovanni (2005) appear to be the 
only studies to have used these data to explicitly analyse patterns in aggregate cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.  
 
For the present analysis we use a fairly restrictive definition of M&A which excludes 
portfolio investment. More particularly, we include all M&As in which the acquirer 
obtains a majority interest in the target by either 
•  acquiring an interest of 50% or over in the target 
•  raising its interest from below to above 50%, or 
•  acquiring the remaining interest it does not already own.
5  
 
Moreover, we concentrate on announced rather than actual M&A. This allows us to 
analyse the desire to merge, which is not necessarily the same as actual mergers due to, for 
example, the impact of merger policy. A large merger may be desired and announced by 
the acquirer (and target) but the competition authority may not allow this transaction to go 
ahead. This instance would, however, still be recorded in the data. The vast majority of 
announced mergers is consummated though.    
 
The database allows us to determine the main industry of the acquirer as well as of the 
target company. Hence, we can determine whether two firms within the same industry 
merge, or whether the merger takes place across industries. The former case is a standard 
                                                 
4 The statistical difference between M&A and FDI explains why the literature on M&A pays more attention 
to its financial characteristics. However, in the present paper we will ignore the potentially important role of 
financial variables (see Giovanni, 2005). 
5 The analysis excludes minority stake acquisitions, repurchase programs, self-tender offers, recapitalisation, 
and exchange offers.  
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horizontal merger whereas the latter combines both vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
More specifically, horizontal M&A is defined as the activity of M&A that takes place 
within the same 4-digit US SIC industry. It is thereby assumed that 4-digit industries 
represent homogenous groupings of firms.
6 The main motivation to engage in horizontal 
cross-border M&A is market access. Non-horizontal mergers are those that take place 
across 4-digit industries.
7 The main question is to see whether horizontal and non-
horizontal mergers are driven by different factors, and particularly to what extent 
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers behave differently in the presence of trade costs. 
 
Table 1 summarises the number of deals and the average value of deals for different types 
of mergers over the 1990s. We distinguish between horizontal and non-horizontal 
transactions as well as between domestic and cross-border deals. When comparing cross-
border M&A with domestic mergers a number of points can be made. First of all, the 
average value of cross-border transactions is substantially higher than that of domestic 
merger transactions. This may reflect the higher fixed cost associated with investment 
abroad.  
 
Second, both in terms of the number of deals as well as their average value the relative 
importance of cross-border mergers in global merger activity is on the increase. The 
number of cross-border deals increased by 146% from 1990/1991 to 2000/2001, while the 
number of domestic deals increased by 116% over the same period. Also in terms of the 
value per merger the importance of cross-border merger activity has increased relative to 
domestic M&A. In particular, the average value of cross-border deals has increased by 
18% relative to 12% for domestic deals. These findings on the development of the number 
                                                 
6 Classifying horizontal and non-horizontal mergers on the basis of their 4-digit SIC code may in some cases 
be too restrictive as some 4-digit industries can be very similar. However, classifying mergers using at 
higher levels of aggregation is likely to contaminate the group of horizontal mergers with non-horizontal 
mergers. As our main focus is with horizontal mergers we prefer a conservative definition of horizontal 
M&A. Our measure horizontal M&A may also underestimate the importance of horizontal M&A in the 
context of multi-product firms. Unfortunately, we do not have any information in the data to satisfactorily 
resolve this issue.  
7 As regards non-horizontal M&As, vertical mergers are mergers that take place across 4-digit industries, 
and reflect mergers between firms that are related through buyer-supplier links. Conglomerate mergers also 
take place across 4-digit industries, but are not associated with input-output linkages. In order to distinguish 
these two types of mergers directly one would need detailed input-output tables for a large number of 
countries in our data, which we do not have available. However, using the Input-Output table for 1992 for 
the US, while assuming that these relationships are representative for the OECD as a whole, and combining 
the IO with bilateral trade data suggests that the actual number of vertical cross-border M&A is very small. 
This is also confirmed by Gugler et al. (2003) who suggest that most mergers across 4-digit industries are 
unrelated to input-output linkages.  
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and the value of cross-border deals are in line with the evidence provided by OECD 
(2001) and Di Giovanni (2005).
8
 
Third, horizontal M&A accounts for about 42% of total global M&A.
9 However, the share 
of horizontal mergers in total cross-border M&A is substantially smaller (at 32%) than 
that of horizontal mergers in domestic M&A (45%). There may be a number of reasons for 
this. On the one hand, the scope for strategic behaviour within one’s own industry may be 
limited at the international level as it may be more difficult to acquire market power. 
Hence, the possibility of strategic horizontal mergers may be restricted. On the other hand, 
non-horizontal mergers may be more frequent in an international context as the potential 
gains from diversification are expected to be larger thus encouraging conglomerate 
mergers, and more related to the theory on foreign direct investment, factor endowments 
and hence prices may differ across countries which makes it interesting to establish 
international production networks through vertical mergers (see Markusen, 2002).  
 
Table 2 focuses solely on cross-border mergers, which are the main interest of this paper. 
It provides details on the number of deals by broad industrial category. Manufacturing is 
the largest acquiring industry, followed by the financial sector. The former is, also, by far 
the most important target industry for mergers. More precisely, manufacturing accounts 
for approximately 40% of cross-border acquirers and targets. The dominance of 
manufacturing in cross-border M&A may be explained by the strong pressure in 
developed economies to restructure its manufacturing activities due to increased foreign 
competition or technological progress. This dominance provides a justification for 
concentrating on manufacturing in the empirical part of this paper. Another reason to 
focus on this sector is that manufacturing is a traded sector, whereas other sectors are less 
tradable. Hence we would expect the role of trade costs to be most visible in 
manufacturing.  
 
Table 3 reports the number of cross-border merger deals by region of origin of acquiring 
and target firms. The dataset distinguishes the following regions: Africa/Middle East 
                                                 
8 UN (2000) does not report an apparent increase in the importance of cross-border M&A in total M&A 
either in terms of the number or their size. This difference results from the different starting point used in the 
World Investment Report (1987 rather than 1990). Di Giovanni (2005) reports larger total numbers, 
although the average values are similar to ours. This may be explained by the more restrictive definition of 
M&A employed in the present paper. 
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(AE), North America (AM), Asia-Pacific (AP), Europe (EU), Japan and South-East Asia 
(JP), and supranational (SN).
10 From the data it follows that by and large the majority of 
M&A activity occurs within the same geographic region. This is in line with the frequent 
finding that international investment, whether FDI, portfolio or M&A, decreases with 
distance (e.g, Carr et al., 2001, Portes and Rey, 2005; Di Giovanni, 2005). We also find, 
however, that a substantial amount of European firms acquire US firms and vice versa.  
Finally, it is apparent that most cross-border M&A take place between developed 
countries. Roughly, 70% of all cross-border deals involve only Europe and North-
America. This number is likely to be even higher when looking at deal values. 
 
3. A Simple Model of Cross-Border M&A  
In this section we develop a simple theoretical model of cross-border M&A in order to 
provide a background for our empirical analysis below.  The model is based on discrete 
choice theory and the dartboard model recently proposed by Head and Ries (2005). We 
extend their model by distinguishing between different types of cross-border M&A, 
namely horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.  
 
The probability of a cross-border acquisition of a given unit in industry j and country l by 
a bidder in industry i and country k is denoted by π. The expected level of bilateral cross-
border M&A, m,  is then given by: 
 
jl ijkl ijkl Y m π =           ( 1 )  
 
where Y refers to the total number of assets available in industry j and country l. We 
assume that the valuation of potential targets is independently and identically distributed 
across bidders.
11 Everything else equal all bidders have an identical probability of winning 
a bid. We further assume that the number of bidders in each industry is proportional to the 
size of its industry. In a frictionless world, the probability of a firm in industry j in country 
l being acquired by a firm in industry i in country k is given by the share of the number of 
bidders in industry i and country k over the total number of bidders in the world.  
                                                                                                                                                   
9 Gugler et el. (2003) provide very similar figures on the importance of horizontal M&A activity.   
10 Transactions involving supranational firms are not recorded in the same way as other transactions as such 
firms have no formal base country. 
11 This represents a strong departure from the theoretical M&A literature (Horn and Persson, 2001; Tekin-
Koru, 2004) in which the price of the bid is endogenously determined in a bargaining game.  
















π          ( 2 )  
 
As we are only interested in cross-border M&A in this paper we exclude the possibility of 
bidding on a firm in the same country.  
 
In order to take account of transaction costs consider a firm g’s private valuation, v*, of a 
potential target, h,  
 
gh gh gh X v ε β + =
*          ( 3 )  
 
which is a function of observed, X, and unobserved characteristics, ε. The last term is a 
random term with Type I Extreme Value distribution with cumulative distribution 
function: )] exp( exp[ ) ( ε ε − − = CDF . The error term refers to the base valuation in a 
frictionless world (Head and Ries, 2005).  
 
In a world where frictions are important the valuation of the firm will be dependent on 
transaction costs. However, the role of transaction costs on its private valuation depends 
on the objective a potential take-over is supposed to fulfil, i.e., whether it is a horizontal or 
a non-horizontal cross-border merger. Transaction costs can play a role in different ways. 
There may be informational barriers which increase the cost of transaction and thereby 
reduce a firm’s private valuation (Portes and Rey, 2005). Though there does not seem any 
reason to believe that informational barriers affect horizontal and non-horizontal mergers 
differently.  
 
However, transaction costs in the form of trade costs may also affect the relative 
attractiveness of alternative modes of entry such as exports and greenfield investment, and 
thereby affect the desire to engage in M&A. For the moment, we solely concentrate on the 
relationship between trade and M&A, and assume that M&A and greenfield investment 
are independent. The latter assumption is admittedly quite restrictive, but allowing for this 
interdependence is beyond the scope of this paper. Theoretical contributions emphasising 
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the interdependence of those two modes of entry are provided by Ferret (2003) and Nocke 
and Yeaple (2004).  
 
A horizontal merger is typically assumed to be driven by market access considerations as 
such mergers may be seen as an alternative to supplying a foreign market through exports. 
In the FDI literature it is generally asserted that the incentive for a profit-maximising firm 
to engage in a horizontal merger increases in the level of trade costs (Markusen, 2002; 
Brainard, 1997).
12 However, Horn and Persson (2001) show that this is not necessarily the 
case in the presence of pre-emptive domestic mergers when the acquisition price is 
determined endogenously in a bargaining process.
13  
 
To the extent that mergers across different industries are driven by vertical linkages, 
mergers facilitate the development of international production networks and are likely to 
complement trade in a way similar to (vertical) greenfield investment (Markusen, 2002). 
Trade costs reduce the cost-saving potential of vertical mergers provided by international 
factor price differences. However, as stated in the previous section the actual number of 
cross-industry mergers driven by input-output linkages is likely to be very small in 
practice. The majority of cross-industry mergers are likely to represent conglomerate deals 
which cannot be assumed to be related to trade costs in any systematic way.  
 
Thus, we assume that a firm’s private valuation depends on transaction costs, either in the 
form of informational barriers or trade costs. However, we only expect a differential effect 
of trade costs across horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. A firm will adjust its private 
valuation by: 
 
  ) ln ln ( 2 1 kl kl τ σ α τ α − −         ( 4 )  
 
where α1 refers to the impact of transaction costs for non-horizontal mergers, particularly 
informational barriers but possibly also trade costs when the merger is motivated by 
vertical linkages. The second term represents an interaction term between the share of 
                                                 
12 We would expect the same if the merger were intended for establishing an export platform for exports to 
third countries, While such an option is not included in the standard theories of vertical and horizontal FDI 
(e.g., Markusen, 2002), it has recently been analysed by Ekholm et al. (2004). 
13 See also Norbäck and Persson (2004) and Tekin-Koru (2004) for related arguments. 
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horizontal mergers over the total number of cross-border mergers, σ,  times the level of 
bilateral transaction costs, τ. The second term thus gives the differential impact of trade 
costs across horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. A priori we would expect this to be 
positive under the “tariff jumping” argument, albeit Horn and Persson (2001) argue that 
this does not necessarily need to be the case. The total impact of transaction costs on a bid 
leading to horizontal M&A (for σ=1) is given by -α1+α2. 
 
In order to operationalise the model we utilise the insights of MacFadden (1974), who 
demonstrated that the probability that a target will yield an investor the highest profits 
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τ σ α α
τ σ α α
      ( 5 )  
 
Since all bidders have an equal probability of procuring the bid the aggregate probability 





























π  if  a kl > + − − ε τ σ α α ln ) ( 2 1     (6) 
 
For a cross-border merger to actually occur the highest bid needs to be profitable: 
a kl > + − − ε τ σ α α ln ) ( 2 1  which states that the winning bid should exceed the level of 
expected additional earnings, a. In the present model the presence of transactions costs 
explains why it is possible to observe no cross-border merger activity across two 
industries.  
 
The expected number of bilateral cross-border M&A is then given by substituting (6) in 
equation (1): 
 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking this is only true if, and only if, ε, is distributed as a Type I Extreme Value independent 
random variable. 
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m          ( 7 )  
 
where  . Head and Ries (2005) label ρ the bid potential, which 
is essentially an index of proximity of bidding teams for a given unit in industry j and 
country l. This measure corresponds to the measure of remoteness sometimes used in the 
trade and geography literature when we assume that 
) / /( 1
1











σ α α τ ρ
1 2 1 = − σ α α (Helliwell, 1998).  
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
Having established in a simple theoretical set-up that trade costs may affect horizontal and 
non-horizontal mergers in different ways, we now present the empirical model, describe 
the variables and the data sources used for the analysis, and discuss the econometric 
methodology.  
 
Empirical Model and Data 
Given the multiplicative nature we log-linearise equation (7) to obtain the following 
estimable model of cross-border mergers (m) of acquirers in industry i in country k with 
target in industry j in country l at time t:
15
 
ijklt t l klt klt jlt ikt ijklt D Y Y m ε ρ α τ σ α τ α α α α + + + + − + + = ln ln ln ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 0   (8) 
 
where Y is the economic size of the industry in each country (measured in terms of value-
added obtained from OECD STAN database), ρ is an indicator of bid potential for country 
l, τ is a proxy for transaction costs and  τ σ ln the interaction term between the share of 
horizontal mergers over total mergers and transaction costs. In addition, we also include a 
full set of time dummies D in order to control for global macro-economic influences and 
asset market bubbles. Initially, we use distance, δ, as a measure of transaction costs. 
                                                 
15 This effectively represents a standard gravity model applied to cross-border M&A. Gravity models have 
had a long history in the empirical analysis of trade flows and, more recently, have also become popular in 
the analysis of foreign direct investment flows (e.g., Carr et al., 2001), equity capital flows (Portes and Rey, 
2005) and M&A activity (e.g., Di Giovanni, 2005). While gravity models based on general equilibrium 
theory (Carr et al., 2001) are conducted at the country level, the present analysis essentially adopts a partial 
equilibrium approach as it is conducted at the industry level. 
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Subsequently, we extend the analysis by adding bilateral data on the level of applied 
protection between country k and l in industry i,τ .
16  
 
In a trade context distance has been interpreted as a measure of trade costs consisting of 
both trade restrictions and transportation costs. Recently, Portes and Rey (2005) show 
using data on bilateral telephone traffic that informational barriers are important in 
determining cross-country capital flows. Consequently, assuming that informational 
barriers to investment increase in distance, it may also proxy for informational barriers. As 
noted before, there seems no reason to assume that informational barriers affect horizontal 
and non-horizontal mergers differently. However, distance may also proxy for trade costs. 
Thus, while the impact of distance for the volume of trade and non-horizontal mergers is 
unambiguously negative, its impact on horizontal M&A is ex ante unclear.  Data on 
distance are obtained from CEPII.  
 
Apart from distance, we also include a variable as a proxy for the bid potential for the 
target country.  This variable can also be interpreted as a measure of remoteness 
(Helliwell, 1998; Head, 2003). Remoteness captures the set of alternative locations from 
which a country may import. The availability of nearby alternatives is important as it 
reduces its dependence on a particular closely located exporting country. For instance the 
amount of trade between Australia and New Zealand is likely to be much larger than that 
between two countries in continental Europe with similar sizes and distance. 
Consequently, ignoring this source of heterogeneity may bias estimates for distance, one 
of our key variable of interest.  
 
Following the theoretical model, the bid potential is defined analogously to remoteness in 
Head (2003) as  . Rather than using output-weighted trade costs we 
use the inverse of the trade costs-weighted industry size which drives the size of far away 
countries to insignificance. Generally, we would expect that the higher the bilateral trade 
costs between target country l and potential investing countries k compared to that 











) / /( 1 τ ρ
                                                 
16 We do not include bilateral country-partner fixed effects in the estimation. This is mainly because we are 
interested in the coefficient on distance, which is a country-partner time invariant variable and would not be 
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m will make an acquisition in country l.  As we implicitly assumed here that  1 2 1 = − σ α α  
we also experiment with interacting the share of horizontal mergers with the bid potential 
as our model suggests that the role of bid potential varies with the type of merger. 
Specifically, we expect the impact of the bid potential to be more positive for non-
horizontal than for horizontal M&A.  
 
Finally, we extend the basic gravity model to see to what extent policy affects cross-
border M&A through its impact on trade costs. The most obvious way to address this 
question is by including trade policy variables in the form of tariffs. More specifically, we 
use bilateral tariff at the sectoral level to measure the tariff rate to which exports of good i 
from country k to country l are subjected. Adding tariffs as an explicit proxy for trade 
costs allows one to assess to what extent the differential effect of distance on horizontal 
and non-horizontal mergers is indeed driven by the presumed interdependence of trade and 
horizontal M&A. In order to assess to what extent non-horizontal mergers are associated 
with re-exports back home we also include a tariff variable to measure the level of 
protection on good i from country l to country k.  
 
Data on the bilateral level of applied protection are obtained from a new dataset called 
Market Access Map (MAcMap), developed jointly by ITC (UNCTAD-WTO, Geneva) and 
CEPII (Paris).
17 It provides detailed information on highly disaggregated bilateral applied 
tariff duties. The tariff data represent equivalent ad valorem tariffs taking into account ad 
valorem and non ad valorem tariffs, quotas, antidumping measures and preferential trade 
agreements. For a detailed description of this dataset see Bouët et al. (2004). As these data 
are only available for the year 2000 we assume that the level of protection is constant 
throughout the sample period.  
 
We estimate the model using data for 23 OECD countries and 19 manufacturing industries 
for the period 1990-2001. In order to enhance the manageability of the dataset we use 2-
year averages except for the last year. This gives us 23 source countries * 22 target 
                                                                                                                                                   
estimated if fixed effects were included. To the extent that country-partner effects are important, they should 
be captured by the distance variable.  
17 The MAcMap database differs from the TRAINS database provided by UNCTAD by its more 
comprehensive treatment of preferential trade agreements and by proposing ad valorem equivalent 
calculations. It thus provides a unique resource that is well equipped to the analysis of applied protection at 
the disaggregated level.  
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countries * 19 source industries * 19 target industries * 6 periods = 1,095,996 
observations. The actual number of observations in the dataset is somewhat smaller due to 
the presence of missing values in the OECD STAN data.  In order to analyse the impact of 
the right-hand side variables on different types of cross-border mergers we interact them 




The data provide us with information on both the number and the value of the merger 
deals. The choice of dependent variable depends on the specific context and has important 
implications for the estimation procedure. The value of the deal reflects the economic 
importance of cross-border M&A. This would therefore be the most appropriate measure 
of M&A activity from a policy perspective. Using deal values as the dependent variable 
also allows one to compare the results with those obtained from trade flows. Di Giovanni 
(2005) uses deal values. However, if one is interested in specific firm decisions such as the 
choice to invest or not to invest, or alternatively, in the choice of location, the number of 
transactions may be more interesting. Bertrand et al. (2004) study the locational choice of 
multinationals using the number of transactions. Using the number of transactions further 
provides a useful robustness check as the count data are not obscured by mega-deals. In 
the present paper we use both definitions of the dependent variable, namely, the number of 
deals as well as the total value of deals alternatively.
19
 
A key issue one needs to address irrespective of the definition of the dependent variable is 
how to account for the presence of zero observations. Whilst the full sample used for 
econometric analysis consists of more than half a million observations the majority of 
those are zero. In fact, the proportion of zero observations is much larger than in previous 
studies since the current analysis is conducted at the industry level. It, thereby, accounts 
for merger deals across industries as well as within industries and, hence, enlarges 
dramatically the number of possible cells compared to standard cross-country analyses of 
investment flows and industry/country level studies of trade flows. Still, the issue of zeros 
                                                 
18 As mergers are classified at the 4-digit level but the analysis is carried out at the 2-digit level the share 
varies between zero and unity for observations within the same 2-digit industry and always equals zero for 
observations across different industries. 
19 Note that for a number of transactions the deal value is missing in the dataset. In these instances the 
transactions were removed from the sample. Similar to Di Giovanni (2005) we assume that missing values 
are randomly distributed.  
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comes up in all gravity studies albeit often less pronounced. Nevertheless, the issue 
appears to have been ignored in most studies.  
 
In the majority of cases zero observations are not related to data availability, but reflect the 
optimal choice of profit maximising firms. Zero cross-border investment may be optimal 
for example in the presence of fixed cost to international investment (Razin et al., 2004). 
The zero observations can therefore be considered corner solution outcomes and should be 
addressed in what Wooldridge (2002) appropriately terms corner solution models, a subset 
of censored regression models.  
 
Linear estimation procedures such as OLS are problematic in this setting, because zero 
cross-border investment has a positive probability, but can be considered a continuous 
random variable for strictly positive values. A linear model would produce biased 
estimates underestimating the coefficients for strictly positive values and predicting 
negative values for observations where actual investment is zero.
20 Non-linear models 
equally suffer a number of drawbacks (see Wooldridge, 2002). The approach used to 
control for such censored observations depends on whether M&A activity is specified in 
terms of its value or the number of transactions. We first discuss the issue in the context of 
the value of M&A and subsequently turn to the issue when using the number of 
transactions. 
 
Recently, a number of papers that look at the value of trade or cross-border capital flows 
have explicitly taken account of zero observations. Di Giovanni (2005) and Felbermayr 
and Kohler (2004) use Tobit estimations to allow for the presence of the limited dependent 
variable. The paper by Felbermayr and Kohler (2004) is particularly interesting in that it 
explicitly adopts the corner solution model as described in Wooldridge (2002) while 
embedding it in a compelling theoretical structure. In our analysis we follow this approach 
and use a Tobit model when using the logarithmic value of the merger as the dependent 
variable.   
 
                                                 
20 It can be shown that using a simple OLS on only the positive observations leads to biased results, as the 
conditional expectation of y on x, given that y > 0, E[Y|X,Y > 0] = β'X + σf(β'X/σ)/F(β'X/σ), where F and f 
are the distribution function and the density, respectively, of the standard normal distribution. 
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The Tobit model allows cross-border M&A to be zero with positive probability and the 
conditional expectation of M&A to be non-linear for positive values of M&A. 
Specifically, the estimation considers the following latent variable model: 
 
y
* = β’X+u   where  u|X~N(0, σ
2)        ( 9 )  
 
where y
*, in our case is the latent value of M&A conditional on the covariates X that 
would be optimal in the absence of any binding constraints. In reality, profit maximisation 
leads to either positive M&A, y
*>0, or no M&A, y=0, which can be summarised by: 
 
          ( 1 0 )   *) , 0 max( y y =
 
In order to evaluate the magnitude of the estimated coefficients one has to calculate the 
partial effects (signs remain the same).
21  
 
In a locational choice model with the number of deals as the dependent variable (not in 
logs) the Tobit model is no longer appropriate. While it appears to be a reasonable 
assumption to treat the value of deals as a continuous variable (and hence employ Tobit 
estimation) this is arguably not the case for the number of deals. Standard OLS (or Tobit) 
would produce biased estimates unless the mean counts are very large. Given that the 




In the Poisson model one assumes that the variable is generated by a Poisson distribution 
of the form 
 
                                                 
21 In order to deal with the fact that the log of zero is not defined we use ln(v+1) as the dependent variable in 
the Tobit estimations where v is the value of cross-border merger activity.  
22 Most research that focuses on the locational choice of multinationals has typically adopted the conditional 
logit model. This model is attractive as it is directly derived from the profit maximisation problem faced by 
investing firms based on McFadden (1974). However, estimating the model with a large choice set as in the 
present case becomes very cumbersome. Previous research has dealt with this issue either by selecting a 
random sample for the large choice set, or by ignoring all zero-observations. Guimaraes et al. (2003) show 
that under certain circumstances the count model is equivalent to the conditional logit. However, in contrast 
to the conditional logit model, count models can deal with large choice sets. Given this insight, Guimaraes et 
al. succinctly state that: “Thus, many previous studies, (…), would have benefited if they had considered the 
Poisson regression as an alternative to the conditional logit model”.  
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where μ is the conditional mean of the distribution. It is then assumed that the expected 
value of n,  μ, is log linearly dependent on some explanatory variables. Parameter 
estimates of these variables can be obtained using maximum likelihood techniques. The 
Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent variable 
equals its variance. If it is found that this restriction does not hold in the data, one may 
employ a negative binomial distribution, which allows for overdispersion in the data, i.e., 
the variance of the dependent variable is allowed to exceed the mean. In our econometric 
analysis we test the validity of this restriction. 
 
The simple Poisson and Negative Binomial models assume that there is no separate 
process for generating zero and non-zero counts. If, however, there were a separate 
underlying model for industries for which we did not observe any merger activity, then a 
zero-inflated Poisson model (ZIP) would be more appropriate.
23 The ZIP model has 
essentially a two stage interpretation. In the first stage, the probability of the outcome 
variable being zero is estimated conditional on a vector of observable covariates X. The 
second stage constitutes a truncated count model for the positive realisations (i.e., the 
outcome is conditional on being non-zero) conditional on observables Z. If the restriction 
of mean-variance equivalence is rejected one can resort to the negative binomial ZIP 
model (ZINB), which allows for overdispersion. As there are a priori no strong reasons to 
expect different variables to explain the decision not to undertake M&As (i.e., first step), 
we use the same vector of variables for X and Z in our estimation (Girma, 2002). We do, 
however, not include any interaction terms in the first stage. 
 
5. Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the baseline gravity equation as specified in equation (8), 
excluding for the moment the tariff variables. In the first column we estimate this model 
with exports of good i from country k to country l in order to see whether our model  and 
the data produce results that are in line with the literature. Reassuringly, they do. We find 
that market size in the home and partner country is positively associated with total exports, 
                                                 
23 See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for descriptions of ZIP models.  See also Girma (2002) and List (2001) 
for application of ZIP models in the context of location of FDI.   
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while distance has a negative impact. Also, the remoteness indicator is positively related 
to exports. These results are as expected from standard gravity models.   
 
We then re-estimate the model on the data for cross-border mergers, using the deal value 
as the dependent variable. Column (2) reports results for total bilateral merger activity. 
Results are similar to the trade model, with mergers increasing in market size and 
remoteness (which, in the case of mergers, is a proxy for the bid potential) but decreasing 
with distance between the home and partner country. Assuming that distance is an 
appropriate measure of trade costs, this result thus points against the “tariff jumping” 
hypothesis for aggregate merger activity. 
 
In column (3) we allow the coefficient on the distance variable to differ between 
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers by including an interaction term defined as the 
share of horizontal mergers in total merger activity. This shows that the coefficients do 
indeed differ for horizontal and non-horizontal mergers; the effect of distance is less 
important the higher the share of horizontal mergers. Columns (4) and (5) provide 
alternative specifications varying the number of interaction terms as a robustness check. 
The results in column (5) show that all interaction terms (with the exception of acquisition 
country market size) are statistically significant and, hence, including them improves the 
model.  
 
The average effect of distance on cross-border M&A is now given by the coefficient of 
distance plus the coefficient on the interaction term times the share of horizontal mergers 
in total mergers. The average value for the share of horizontal mergers is 0.32. The 
average effect of distance in columns (3) to (5) ranges from 0.05 to -0.02 depending on 
whether one includes the full set of interaction terms or not. Alternatively, one may 
calculate the critical value of HMA at which the marginal effect of distance switches 
signs. If the share of horizontal mergers in total mergers exceeds 0.21 (0.105/0.497) or 
0.44 (0.087/0.197) in columns (3) and (5) respectively, then the impact of distance on 
bilateral merger activity will be positive. Conversely, for shares lower than the critical 
value the impact of distance will negative. The percentage of observations where the share 
of horizontal mergers exceeds the critical value of 0.21 is 32.4% and 29.5% for a critical 
value 0.44.  
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While a negative effect of distance on cross-border capital flows has been found in most 
previous work (see for example, Carr et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005; Di Giovanni, 
2005), those studies are all conducted at the country level. Using our sectoral data we 
show that the effect of distance differs between different types of merger activity.  More 
particularly, while the estimated average effect of distance is negative it is positive for 
horizontal mergers alone.  Assuming that distance is a proxy for barriers to trade, this is in 
line with the theoretical expectations of a tariff-jumping motive for horizontal mergers.
24
 
Given that the database provides information not only on the total value of cross-border 
mergers but also on the number of deals an interesting extension to the analysis is to 
investigate whether there are differences in the determinants of the number as opposed to 
the total logarithmic value of deals. We therefore change the analysis towards the issue of 
locational choice. We re-estimate equation (8) with the number of deals as the dependent 
variable using different count models. A likelihood-ratio test for the restriction that the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable equals its variance rejects this assumption and 
points at over-dispersion for all estimations. Hence, we report the negative binomial 
results rather than the standard Poisson estimates. Furthermore, employing a test due to 
Vuong (1989) we find that a zero-inflated model better captures the underlying decision 
process. In our discussion we, therefore, focus on the results from the zero-inflated 
negative binomial estimations, which are reported in columns (5) to (8) of Table 5. 
 
Columns (5) to (8) show that the results for total merger activity are qualitatively similar 
to the results obtained from the Tobit regressions above. The only significant differences 
are the statistically insignificant coefficient on Yk in column (5), and the insignificance of 
the interaction terms in column (8). Hence, we prefer the models in columns (6) and (7) 
which only interact the share of horizontal mergers with distance and remoteness. 
Allowing for different coefficients on the distance and remoteness variables for the two 
types of merger activities shows again statistically significant differences. This therefore 
provides a further robustness check to the Tobit regressions.  
 
                                                 
24 This is in contrast to the evidence provided by Tekin-Koru (2004), who uses firm level data on total 
merger activity and does not distinguish between horizontal and non-horizontal activities.  Note that in the 
aggregate our results, like those by Tekin-Koru, point against the tariff-jumping argument. The present 
finding that the effect of distance is increasing in the share of horizontal mergers however is inconsistent 
  22 
 
6. Cross-border M&A and Trade Policy 
Above we assumed that the differential impact of distance and remoteness across different 
types of merges results from the interdependence between trade and cross-border M&A. 
We now re-examine the issue using industry level data on the bilateral level of applied 
protection. More precisely, we use a new dataset, which converts different types of tariffs, 
quotas, antidumping measures and preferential trade agreements into a single equivalent 
ad valorem tariff. As these data are only available for the year 2000 we assume that tariffs 
are, like distance, constant across time. 
25
 
Looking at trade policy indicators allows one to verify to what extent the reasoning that 
distance and remoteness proxy for trade barriers is indeed plausible as the trade policy 
variables included here refer explicitly to international trade and in principle have no 
bearing on international investment as long as investment abroad is independent of 
international trade.  However, if trade and investment are interdependent changes in the 
trade policy stance may not only affect the pattern of trade but also the level and 
composition of inward investment. If this were indeed the case this may have to be taken 
into account by policy makers, given the importance that has been attached in the past to 
attracting foreign multinationals in the hope that these will stimulate jobs and/or generate 
productivity spillovers.  
 
The estimations are thus extended by including the bilateral ad valorem equivalent tariff 
applicable to exports of good i from country k to country l. The results are reported in 
Table 6 using the Tobit model only. We start again with estimating the impact of trade 
policy on exports to check whether our results are plausible in the context of a standard 
gravity model of trade (column 1). As one can see from the table both distance and tariffs 
have a negative effect on exports, as would be expected. Interestingly, when comparing 
the coefficient on distance with that in Table 4 we observe that adding explicit information 
on the level of bilateral protection reduces the impact of distance on exports from -0.9 to -
0.6 thereby suggesting that distance proxies to some extent for bilateral protection in 
addition to transportation and information costs.  
                                                                                                                                                   
with the theoretical prediction by Tekin-Koru and others of a negative relationship due to the impact of 
distance on the acquisition price. 
25 The results remain qualitatively the same once one uses period averages.  
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We then turn to the effect of trade policy on cross-border merger activity. Column (2) 
shows that trade barriers negatively affect total M&As. However, allowing for different 
coefficients of trade policy for horizontal and non-horizontal mergers again highlights the 
heterogeneity between these two groups.  From column (3) we find a negative coefficient 
on the term interacting the share of horizontal M&As and tariffs, which is perhaps 
unexpected. In principle, this would suggest that while protection tends to reduce cross-
border merger activity in general the impact of protection would affect horizontal M&A 
by less than non-horizontal M&A.  
 
However, note that in this regression distance is also statistically insignificant, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that the effect of distance on M&As mainly reflects trade costs, which 
are now better captured with the tariff variable.
26 Dropping distance from the estimations 
shows that we then obtain a negative sign on tariffs, and a positive sign on the interaction 
term for tariffs and horizontal M&As. This suggests that the impact of trade costs on 
cross-border M&A is less negative or even positive the higher the share of horizontal 
mergers in total mergers. This is in line with the argument emphasised throughout this 
paper that cross-border M&A in the same industries tend to substitute for exports. Indeed, 
we may interpret this as evidence in support of the tariff-jumping argument set out by 
Brainard (1997).  
 
The tariff variable, as pointed out above, captures the tax equivalent of applied protection 
on exports from the acquisition to the target country. We argued above that this cost 
provides a rationale for exporting firms to look for takeover targets abroad. We did not 
however say much about the possible relationship between tariffs and non-horizontal 
merges even though it seems not unlikely that at least some part of non-horizontal M&A 
represents vertical mergers. These are likely not only to be more negatively affected by 
taxes on its exports but also on changes in the costs of re-exports from the target to the 
acquisition country. We now address this issue in more detail.  
 
Instead of relying on direct information on trade patterns and input-output linkages, which 
suggests that vertical mergers are relatively unimportant, including ad valorem equivalent 
                                                 
26 The pairwise correlation between the log of distance and the tariff on exports from the acquisition to the 
target country equals 0.37. 
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tariffs on imports from to the target to the acquisition provides an indirect method to infer 
to what extent the vertical motive is likely to play an important role in explaining non-
horizontal mergers. We thus proceed by including a measure of the level of applied 
protection on exports from country l to country k in the estimation. As can be seen from 
columns (6) and (7), this variable is also negatively related with total M&A activity. This 
negative effect is again less for industries with higher levels of horizontal mergers, as 
indicated by the positive sign on the interaction term. In contrast to the direct estimates on 
the importance of vertical mergers in total merger activity, the indirect estimates based on 
regression analysis obtained here suggest that the share of vertical mergers in non-
horizontal mergers may be substantial.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses in detail the role of trade costs on bilateral cross-border M&As for 23 
OECD countries over 1990-2001 using industry level data on merger activity and a new 
data source on with detailed information on the bilateral level of applied protection. In the 
aggregate, distance and tariff barriers have negative effects on cross-border M&A. An 
important finding of our paper is that the effect of distance and trade costs differs 
depending on whether mergers are horizontal (i.e., with acquirer and target in the same 
industry) or whether they span different industries. This suggests that results based on 
aggregate data which do not distinguish these types neglect an important source of 
heterogeneity. The less negative effect on horizontal mergers provides support to the tariff 
jumping argument put forward in the literature on the determinants of horizontal FDI. 
 
Our findings have important policy implications. The main findings in the paper that 
cross-border M&A respond negatively to trade costs in the aggregate and that the share of 
horizontal M&A increases in the level of trade costs provide an additional rational for free 
trade. To the extent that horizontal mergers are less likely to be associated with 
productivity spillovers and more likely with anticompetitive behaviour up freeing up trade 
not only increases the level of inward investment but also its composition in a way that is 
likely to benefit the economy.  The trade regime might thus have important implications 
for attracting inward investment in terms of M&As, an issue that should be recognised by 
governments wishing to attract foreign investment in order to benefit from technology and 
spillovers. 
 
  25 
References 
 
Anderson, J. and E. Van Wincoop (2004), “Trade Costs”, Journal of Economic Literature, 
forthcoming.  
 
Bertrand, O., J. Mucchielli and H. Zitouna (2004), "Location Choices of Multinational 
Firms: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions", HWWA Discussion Paper 274. 
 
Bouët, A., Y. Decreux, L. Fontagé, S. Jean and D. Laborde (2004), “A Consitent, ad 
valeorem equivalent measure of applied protection across the world: The MAcMap-HS6 
database”, CEPII Working Paper, No. 22.  
 
Brainard, S. L. (1997), “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-
Off Between Multinational Sales and Trade”, American Economic Review, 87, pp. 520-
545,  
 
Cameron, A.C. and P.K. Trivedi (1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carr, D.L., J.R. Markusen and K.E. Maskus (2001), Estimating the knowledge-capital 
model of the multinational enterprise, American Economic Review, 91, pp. 693-708. 
 
Di Giovanni, J. (2005), “What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A 
activity and financial deepening”, Journal of International Economics, 65, pp. 127-149.  
 
Ekholm, K., R. Forslid and J. Markusen (2004), “Export Platform Foreign Direct 
Investment”, NBER Working Paper, No. 9517. 
 
Felbermayr, G.J. and W. Kohler (2004), “Exploring the Intensive and Extensive Margins 
of World Trade”, CESIfo Working Paper. 
 
Ferrett, B. (2003), “Greenfield Investment versus Acquisition: Positive Analysis”, GEP 
Research Paper 03/02, University of Nottingham  
 
Girma, S. (2002), “The process of European integration and the determinants of entry by 
non-EU multinationals in UK manufacturing”, The Manchester School, 71, pp. 315-335. 
 
Gugler, K., D. C. Mueller, B. B. Yurtoglu and C. Zulehner (2003), “The Effects of 
Mergers: An International Comparison”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
21, pp. 625-653.  
 
Guimaraes, P. O. Figueirdo, and D. Woodward (2003), “A Tractable Approach to the Firm 
Location Problem”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, pp. 201-204.  
 
Head, K. (2003), “Gravity for Beginners”, UBC Working Paper 
 
Head, K. and J. Ries (2005), "Judging Japan's FDI: The Verdict from a Dartboard Model," 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, forthcoming 2005.  
 
  26 
Helliwell, J.F. (1998), How Much Do National Borders Matter?, Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution.   
 
Horn, H. and L. Persson (2001), “The Equilibrium Ownership of an International 
Oligopoly”, Journal of International Economics, 53, pp. 307-333. 
 
List, J.A. (2001), “US Country Level Determinants of Inbound FDI: Evidence from a two 
step modified count data model”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, pp. 
953-973. 
 
Manchin, M. (2004), “Determinants of European cross-border mergers and acquisitions”, 
European Commission, European Economy Economic Papers, No. 212. 
 
Markusen, J.R., Multinational firms and the theory of international trade, MIT Press, 
2002 
 
Martin, P. and H. Rey (2005), “Financial super-markets: Size matters for asset trade”, 
Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.  
 
McFadden, D.L. (1974), “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Analysis”, in 
P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics,  New York: Academic Press, pp. 105-142.  
 
Nocke, V. and S. Yeaple (2004), “An assignment theory of foreign direct investment”, 
NBER Working Paper 11003. 
 
Norbäck, P.J. and L. Persson (2004), “Privatization and foreign competition”, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 62, pp. 409-416. 
 
OECD (2001), New Patterns of Industrial Globalisation, Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances.  
 
Portes, R. and H. Rey (2005), “The determinants of cross-border equity flows”, Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 269-296.  
 
Portes, R., H. Rey and Y. Oh (2001), “Information and capital flows: the determinants of 
transactions in financial assets”, European Economic Review, 45, 783-796. 
 
Razin, A., Y. Rubinstein, and E. Sadka (2003), “Which countries export FDI, and how 
much?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 10145.  
 
Tekin Koru, A. (2004), “Is FDI indeed tariff-jumping? Firm level evidence”, mimeo, 
University of Oregon. 
 
UNCTAD (2000), “Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development”, World 
Investment Report, Geneva: United Nations. 
 
UNCTAD (2001), “Promoting Linkages”, World Investment Report 2001, Geneva: United 
Nations. 
 
  27 
Vuong, Q.H. (1989), “Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested 
hypotheses”, Econometrica, Vol. 57, pp. 307-333. 
 
 
  28 
Table 1: Summary statistics M&A, 1990-2001 
 
  Domestic M&A Cross-border M&A All
 
Non-
Hor Horizontal Total 
Non-
Hor Horizontal Total Non-Hor  Horizontal Total 
                
Number of deals 
                
1990/1991  55.36% 44.64%  6,281  70.15% 29.85%  2,161  59.14% 40.86%  8,442 
1992/1993  58.01% 41.99%  7,575  69.24% 30.76%  2,123  60.47% 39.53%  9,698 
1994/1995  53.58% 46.42%  10,245  68.16% 31.84%  2,921  56.81% 43.19%  13,166 
1996/1997  53.73% 46.27%  13,760  66.82% 33.18%  3,668  56.48% 43.52%  17,428 
1998/1999  53.19% 46.81%  17,586  67.91% 32.09%  5,042  56.47% 43.53%  22,628 
2000/2001  59.46% 40.54%  13,557  68.75% 31.25%  5,319  62.08% 37.92%  18,876 
                
Total  55.31% 44.69%  69,004  68.33% 31.67%  21,234  58.38% 41.62%  90,238 
                
Average deal value (mln $) 
                
1990/1991  50.95 41.04  46.53  61.37 54.49  59.32  54.11 43.56  49.80 
1992/1993  40.45 38.82  39.76  48.71 44.05  47.27  42.52 39.71  41.41 
1994/1995  38.71 44.19  41.25  45.92 49.09  46.93  40.63 44.99  42.51 
1996/1997  49.35 55.10  52.01  59.35 63.83  60.83  51.84 56.50  53.87 
1998/1999  51.45 52.55  51.96  64.67 70.70  66.60  54.99 55.53  55.23 
2000/2001  48.66 57.62  52.29  69.80 71.33  70.28  55.26 60.80  57.36 
                















          
1205  194  79 61 53 46 34  1672  Agriculture & 
Mining           
Manufacturing   269  6597  180 636 162 412 178  8434 
          
64 150  1246  50  43 176 31  1760  Transportation 
&  Public  Util.          
Wholesale  48 346 49 831 42 107 20  1443 
          
233 859 309 248  2260  499 108  4516  Finance, Ins. & 
Estate          
Other  services 46  232 107 146 108  1931  136  2706 
          
47  142  27 36 27 87  277  643  Health & 
E d u c a t i o n           
Total  1909 8514 2005 2009 2695 3258  784 21174 
Government sector excluded.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics Cross-Border M&A by Region, 1990-2001 
 
AE AM  AP EU JP  SN Total  Acquirer\Target 
         
AE  170  131  71  144    516 
         
AM 209  4,054  814 2,337  68  2 7,484 
         
AP 65  377  2,083  325 29    2,879 
         
EU 237  2,398  729  6,363  44 2  9,773 
         
JP  3 243 165 135  21   567 
         
SN  1 1 8 5      15 
         
Total  685 7,204 3,870 9,309  162  4  21,234 
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Table 4: Basic gravity model for trade and M&A, Tobit estimations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Exports  M&A  M&A   M&A   M&A  
Yk 0.173 0.271 0.184 0.187 0.189 










Yl 0.446 0.283 0.205 0.204 0.209 










δ  -0.913 -0.142 -0.105 -0.083 -0.087 










ρ  0.315 0.140 0.077 0.084 0.090 










Yk*HMA       -0.044 
      
(0.034) 
 
Yl*HMA       -0.154 
      
(0.038) 
*** 
δ*HMA      0.497 0.067 0.197 







ρ*HMA      -0.213  -0.367 





Constant  7.437 -10.565  -7.919 -8.000 -7.988 










Obs.  37108  697970 697970 697970 697970 
Pseudo R
2 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Log Likelihood  -87952.7 -18711.0 -15975.7 -15891.7 -15880.0 
The marginal effects are computed for the expected value of the dependent 
variable conditional on being uncensored. A full set of time dummies is 
included, all variables are in logs.  Standard errors in parentheses, * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, for industry i in acquisition 
country k, and industry j in target country l. 
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Table 5: Estimating the number of mergers, count data models 
 
  Negative binomial Zero-inflated negative binomial
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 








































































Yk*HMA      -0.003      0.049 
     
(0.094) 
    
(0.091) 
 
Yl*HMA      0.167      0.092 
     
(0.108) 
     
(0.104) 
 
δ*HMA    1.077 0.487 0.390    1.035 0.267 0.174 













ρ*HMA     -0.268  -0.138     -0.345  -0.239 



























Obs.  699718 699718 699718 699718 699718 699718 699718 699718 
Pseudo R




























[0.000]      
Vuong        9.78 6.84 5.17 4.73 
A full set of time dummies is included, all variables are in logs. Standard errors in parentheses, 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, for industry i in acquisition 
country k, and industry j in target country l. 
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Yk 0.197 0.292 0.198 0.292 0.267 0.283 0.256 














Yl 0.507 0.291 0.210 0.291 0.270 0.304 0.278 














δkl -0.646 -0.001 -0.006         
  (0.016) 
*** 
(0.015)  (0.012)      






























τlk       -5.886  -6.992 
 





δkl*HMA     0.484        
     (0.011)      




***   
(1.787) 
***   
(2.235) 
*** 
τlk*HMA         2 4 . 5 5 9  
 
      
(2.495) 
*** 
Constant  3.094 -12.568 -9.277 -12.406  -11.313 -9.959  -8.811 














Observations  37108  648626 648626 648626 648626 602370 602370 
Pseudo R
2 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.12 
Log 
likelihood  -86933.1 -18265.3 -17711.4 -18265.3 -17711.4 -17675.4 -17068.5 
The marginal effects are computed for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional 
on being uncensored. A full set of time dummies is included, all variables are in logs (except 
tariff variables).  Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%, for industry i in acquisition country k, and industry j in target country l. 
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